Peter Róna(editor)
Peter Róna is Senior Fellow at Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford. He was born in Hungary, moved to America in 1956, and obtained an Honours degree from the University of Pennsylvania berfore further studies with a First Class Honours degree at University College, Oxford. After a distinguished career in America, where he became the President of Schroders, he returned to Hungary and served as the CEO of the First Hungary Fund, from which he retired in 2003. Between 2003 and 2010 he taught at Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest.Peter Róna is Senior Fellow at Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford. He was born in Hungary, moved to America in 1956, and obtained an Honours degree from the University of Pennsylvania berfore further studies with a First Class Honours degree at University College, Oxford. After a distinguished career in America, where he became the President of Schroders, he returned to Hungary and served as the CEO of the First Hungary Fund, from which he retired in 2003. Between 2003 and 2010 he taught at Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest.
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Peter Róna is Senior Fellow at Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford. He was born in Hungary, moved to America in 1956, and obtained an Honours degree from the University of Pennsylvania berfore further studies with a First Class Honours degree at University College, Oxford. After a distinguished career in America, where he became the President of Schroders, he returned to Hungary and served as the CEO of the First Hungary Fund, from which he retired in 2003. Between 2003 and 2010 he taught at Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest.
الأكثر شهرة
Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics
This open access book provides an exploration of the consequences of the ontological differences between natural and social objects (sometimes described as objects of nature and objects of thought) in the workings of causal and agency relationships. One of its important and possibly original conclusions is that causal and agency relationships do not encompass all of the dependent relationships encountered in social life. The idea that social reality is contingent has been known (and largely undisputed) at least since Wittgenstein’s “On Certainty”, but social science, and most notably economics has continued to operate on the basis of causal and agency theories borrowed or adapted from the natural sciences. This volume contains essays that retain and justify the partial or qualified use of this approach and essays that totally reject any use of causal and agency theory built on determined facts (closed systems).The rejection is based on the possibly original claim that, whereas causation in the objects of the natural sciences reside in their properties, human action is a matter of intentionality. It engages with critical realist theory and re-examines the role of free will in theories of human action in general and economic theory in particular.
